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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
TRISTAM B. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROSWELL MILLER, III, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8522 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from an order entered by the trial 
court on the 22nd day of March, 1956, in favor of Plaintiff 
and Respondent, ordering the Defendant and Appellant to 
answer certain questions propounded to him in a deposition 
(R. 47-48). 
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Plaintiff, Tristam B. Johnson, commenced this action 
against the Defendant, Roswell Miller, III, to recover dam-
ages for the alienation of affections and criminal conver-
sation of Plaintiff's former wife (R. 1-4). Defendant and 
Plaintiff's former wife were married and living in Salt 
Lake City, Utah at the time this action was commenced, 
and were at that time and for some time had been residents 
of the State of Utah (R. 1, 14, 65, p. 2). Plaintiff's com-
plaint alleges generally that between January, 1954 and 
July, 1955, Defendant alienated the affections of Plaintiff's 
wife and engaged in criminal conversation with her. De-
fendant's motion for more definite statement, to require 
Plaintiff to allege the time and place the alleged wrongful 
misconduct occurred, was denied (R. 11). Thus, Plaintiff 
was not limited by his complaint as to the particular times 
and places at which the alleged acts occurred. 
On January 13, 1956, prior to the filing of Defendant's 
answer, Plaintiff took the deposition of the Defendant upon 
oral examination (R. 65). Defendant refused to answer 
many of the questions on the specific ground that the 
answers might tend to incriminate him (R. 65, at p.p. 7, 
8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37). No other ground 
for refusing to answer said questions was stated. There-
after, pursuant to Plaintiff's motion (R. 23-24), the trial 
court entered the order from which this appeal was taken, 
ordering the Defendant to answer the questions and· assess-
ing attorneys' fees against Defendant in the sum of $100.00 
(R. 47-48). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts which are material to this appeal relate pri-
marily to the record and history of the case from the com-
mencement of the action to the present appeal. Since Ap-
pellant's brief does not disclose the sequence of events, the 
following summary of the litigation from the commence-
ment of the action to the entry of the order of the trial 
court is necessary : 
1. On November 8, 1955, Plaintiff commenced suit 
against the Defendant and a complaint was filed setting 
forth two causes of action, one for alienation of affections, 
and the other for criminal conversation (R. 1-6). 
2. On November 28, 1955, a stipulation was entered 
into by the parties and an order was entered giving the 
Defendant until December 8, 1955 to answer or otherwise 
plead to Plaintiff's complaint (R. 7). 
3. On December 5, 1955, Plaintiff served notice upon 
the Defendant that Defendant's deposition would be taken 
on December 21, 1955 (R. 8). 
4. On December 8, 1955, Defendant filed a motion 
to dismiss and a motion to require Plaintiff to make a more 
definite statement (R. 9). 
5. At the request of the Defendant and based upon 
his illness, the deposition was continued until January 4, 
1956. Subsequently, at the further request of the Defen-
dant, the deposition was continued until January 13, 1956. 
6. On January 5, 1956, Plaintiff served notice· that 
Defendant's motion to dismiss and to make a more definite 
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statement would be called up for hearing on January 11, 
1956 (R. 12). 
7. On January 11, 1956, Defendant's motion came on 
for hearing; Defendant did not appear to argue in support 
of said motions, and the trial court denied both motions and 
granted the Defendant ten days in which to file an answer 
to Plaintiff's complaint (R. 13). 
8. On January 13, 1956, Defendant's deposition was 
taken before Hyrum R. Moulton, a certified shorthand re-
porter ( R. 65) . 
9. On January 23, 1956, Defendant filed his answer 
denying generally the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint 
(R. 14-15). 
10. On February 17, 1956, Plaintiff filed a motion 
pursuant to Rule 37 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure for an order directing and compelling the Defen-
dant to answer the questions propounded in said deposition. 
On the same date, a notice was served and filed, calling said 
motion up for hearing on February 27, 1956 (R. 23). 
11. On or about February 23, 1956, pursuant to De-
fendant's request, the above motion was stricken from the 
calendar. 
12. On March 1, 1956, Plaintiff se·rved and filed a 
demand for trial, certificate and order (R. 51). 
13. Plaintiff's motion to compel Defendant to answer 
the questions propounded in said deposition was reset to be 
heard before the court on March 14, 1956. 
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14. On March 9, 1956, pursuant to an ex parte order 
of the court, Defendant filed an amendment to his ans.wer 
pleading for the first time the statutes of New Jersey and 
New York abolishing suits for alienation of affections (R. 
16-17). 
15. On March 14, 1956, Plaintiff's motion was argued 
to the trial court and was taken under advisement (R. 25-
42). 
16. On March 14, 1956, the same day Plaintiff's mo-
tion was heard by the court, Defendant obtained leave ex 
parte and filed an amendment to the amendment filed on 
March 9, 1956, pleading certain other foreign statutes (R. 
19-20). 
17. On March 16, 1956, Defendant again obtained 
leave ex parte from the court and filed a second amendment 
to the amendment filed March 9, 1956 (R. 21-22). 
18. On March 21, 1956, further proceedings and stip-
ulations were held and made before the trial court to allow 
Defendant to introduce still more statutes for the first time 
(R. 43-46). 
19. On March 22, 1956, the trial court enteTed its 
written order granting Plaintiff's motion and ordering 
Defendant to answer the questions propounded in the 
deposition (except such questions as were objected to on 
the ground of privilege between husband and wife). Plain-
tiff was awarded One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) as reason-
able attorneys' fees in obtaining said order, on the ground 
that Defendant's refusal to answer s.aid questions was with-
out substantial justification. 
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The deposition of Defendant was taken on January 13, 
1956, prior to the filing of Defendant's answer. The deposi-
tion was taken by Plaintiff for the purpose of discovery 
and to obtain evidence from the Defendant that would other• 
wise have required a great deal of expense and the exam-
ination of numerous witnesses from many jurisdictions. The 
Defendant refused to answer all of the questions propounded 
with reference to his conduct with Plaintiff's former wife, 
Helen Harris Johnson. In answer to the first such ques-
tion, Mr. McBroom, counsel for the Defendant, stated (R. 
65, p. 7) : 
"Just a moment. The witness declines to answer 
the question because the question calls for an answer 
that may tend to incriminate the witness." 
Defendant's refusal to answer the other questions concern-
ing this subject merely referred back to the above objection. 
At no time was_ any object~on to the questions propounded 
interposed on the ground that the causes of action com-
plained -of were barred by statutes in certain other states 
or that the answers would tend to degrade the Defendant. 
Plaintiff's motion to compel the Defendant to answer 
said questions was filed on February 17, 1956 and it was 
noticed to be heard on February 27, 1956 (R. 23). Defen-
dant did not even plead the statutes of the other states, 
which he now relies upon, until on and after March 9, 1956 
(R. 16-17). Had it not been for the indulgence of Plaintiff 
in agreeing that his motion would not be called for hearing 
on February 27, 1956, these statutes would not even have 
been part of the record prior to the court's order from 
which this appeal is taken. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE ISSUES RAISE,D BY POINT I OF APPEL-
LANT'S BRIEF WERE NOT PROPERLY IN 
ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTES RELIED UPON BY APPEL-
LANT DO NOT LEGALLY JUSTIFY THE RE-
FUSAL BY APPELLANT TO ANSWER THE 
QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED. 
POINT III 
THE ORDER APPEALED FROM DOES NOT 
VIOLATE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 




THE ISSUES RAISED BY POINT I OF APPEL-
LANT'S BRIEF WERE NOT PROPERLY IN 
ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
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The first and primary ground relied upon by Appellant 
for the reversal of the order of the trial court relates to the 
existence of certain statutes in the states of New Jersey, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Nevada and Wyoming abolishing 
the causes of action for alienation of affections and crim-
inal conversation. Appellant studiously avoids pointing out, 
however, as is so clearly shown by the above statement of 
facts and the record on file herein, that these statutes were 
not in issue before the trial court. 
One can search the deposition of the Defendant in vain 
for any objection whatsoever based on these statutes on 
which Defendant now relies. As quoted supra on page 6, 
Defendant's sole objection to the questions propounded 
related to the issue of self incrimination. 
Not until after the date originally set for the hearing 
on Plaintiff's motion to compel the answers to said ques-
tions did the Defendant even plead the statutes in question 
(R. 19-22). At the time Defendant's deposition was taken 
these statutes were not mentioned and they had not been 
injected into the case. At the hearing on Plaintiff's motion, 
counsel for Plaintiff objected to the raising of this addi-
tional ground as a basis for Defendant's refusal to answer 
the questions and argued that the Defendant waived any 
reliance upon said statutes by virtue of his failure to object 
and by the denial of his motion to dismiss (R. 34, 38-40). 
It is one of the most basic rules of evidence that a party 
cannot object to the admission of evidence on one specific 
ground at the trial and upon appeal argue that the evidence 
was erroneously admitted because of another and different 
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objection. 4 C. J. S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 248; 3 Am. 
Jur., Appeal and Error, Sec. 344-346. The same principle 
is applicable to the situation in this case. Defendant should 
not be allowed to object to questions posed on deposition on 
one ground and then rely on another completely different 
ground at a later hearing to sustain his position. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTES RELIED UPON BY APPEL-
LANT DO NOT LEGALLY JUSTIFY THERE-
FUSAL BY APPELLANT TO ANSWER THE 
QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED. 
It is Plaintiff's earnest contention that the trial court 
was not obligated to take cognizance of this issue, since it 
was not properly before that court. Defendant's contention 
however, that the existence of statutes abolishing causes 
of action for alienation· of affections in the various states 
cited justifies the refusal to answer the questions asked 
to him on deposition, is wholly without merit. 
As previously noted, Plaintiff's com plaint alleges a 
cause of action for alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation. The complaint alleges that between January, 
1954 and July, 1955, defendant alienated Plaintiff's wife's 
affections and engaged in unlawful relations with her. The 
nature of the tort involved necessarily comprehends a course 
of conduct over a period of many months. As is indicated 
by the questions posed at the deposition, it is Plaintiff's 
contention that the alienating acts committed by the De-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
fendant occurred in many diffe·rent states in the United 
States, including possibly the states of Utah and Idaho, as 
well as in Canada. In order for Plaintiff to present his case, 
it will be necessary to establish a chain of related events 
occurring at many different times and places. 
The purpose of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the provisions in particular dealing with discovery, are to 
provide a litigant with an efficient and economical method 
of discovering and proving the facts essential to his cause 
of action. Where the facts involved are peculiarly within 
the knowledge of one of the parties, the use of a deposition 
provides the best and sometimes the only possible means of 
obtaining this information. 
_An example of the type of questions which Defendant 
refused to answer are the following: 
"Were there ever any occasions when you and 
Helen (Plaintiff's former wife) would meet when 
either Tris (Plaintiff) or your wife was not there in 
January, February or March of 1954 ?" (R. 65, p. 7). 
"Did you and Helen, in January, February or 
March or April, 1954 ever have any prearranged 
meetings in places other than Princeton, New J er-
sey?" (R. 65, p. 8). 
"\\1hen you were in New York City, did you 
ever have occasion to see Helen whose name was 
then Johnson ?" ( R. 65, p. 16) . 
"Did you ever make a visit to Twin Falls, Idaho 
in January, February or March, 1955 ?" (R. 65, p. 
32). 
"Were you at the Lake O'Hara Lodge (Canada) 
from the fourth of July, 1954 to the tenth day of 
July, 1954 ?" (R. 65, p. 32). 
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All of the foregoing questions and the many others 
which Defendant refused to answer were obviously designed 
to show this course of conduct by the Defendant to and with 
the Plaintiff's wife. 
Rule 26 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides with respect to the scope· of examination upon deposi-
tion as follows: 
"Unless otherwise ordered by the court as pro-
vided by Rule 30 (b) or (d), the deponent may be 
examined regarding any matter, not privileged, 
which is relevant to the subject-matter involved in 
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or 
defense of the examining party, or to the claim or 
defense of any other party, including the existence, 
description, nature, custody, condition and location 
of any books, documents, or other tangible things 
and the identity and location of persons having 
knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground for 
objec·tion that the testirnony will be inadmissibl'e at 
the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence." (Emphasis added.) 
It might be noted that the Defendant made no attempt, 
prior to the deposition, to have the scope of examination 
limited as provided in Rule 30 (b) . 
An examination of the questions propounded in the 
deposition clearly indicates that they all involved matters 
which were relevant to the subject-matter of the Plaintiff's 
claim. Even assuming the validity of the argument under 
Point I, of Defendant's brief, the very most that can be 
said is that some doubt may exist as to the admissibility 
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of certain parts of the evidence sought to be obtained. Rule 
26 (b) , quoted above, specifically provides that the inadmis-
sibility of the evidence at the trial is no· ground for its ex-
clusion on deposition if it is reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence. There can be no 
doubt as to the importance of the information sought to be 
obtained from the Defendant and its value in discovering 
admissible evidence when the nature of the cause of action 
is considered. 
Recognizing the fact that the inadmissibility of the 
evidence is not sufficient to justify Defendant's refusal to 
answer, Plaintiff then attempts to bolster his position by 
relying on Section 78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
which provides that a witness need not answer questions 
"which will have a direct tendency to degrade his character 
unless it is to the very fact in issue or to a fact from which 
the fact in issue would be presumed." See State v. Hougen-
sen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229. In the present case, the 
degrading conduct of the Defendant is the precise fact in 
issue. Even if the evidence as to conduct in certain states 
were inadmissible, certainly the fact that the immoral acts 
took place in one state would indicate and tend to show the 
disposition of the deponent to commit such acts and that 
the same conduct was pursued and continued by the Defen-
dant in other states, including even Utah, Idaho, and in the 
various provinces of Canada. 
It should again be pointed out that Defendant like-
wise did not rely on Section 78-24-9 or the claim of degrada-
tion of character at the time the questions were propounded 
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or before the trial court on the hearing on Plaintiff's mo-
tion belo"\V (R. 25-42). 
Appellant admits in his brief (p. 3), as is the fact, 
that part of the questions under consideration concern his 
conduct with Plaintiff's former wife in the State of Idaho 
and in Canada. No claim is made, however, that these 
jurisdictions have enacted statutes barring causes of action 
for alienation of affections or criminal conversation. Such 
actions are clearly recognized in the State of Idaho. Riggs 
v. Smith, 52 Idaho 43, 11 P. 2d 358; Johnson v. Richards, 
60 Idaho 150, 294 Pac. 507. The Canadian Courts likewise 
recognize causes of action for alienation of affections and 
criminal conversation. Lellis v. Lambert, 24 0. A. R. 653; 
Ne~vton v. Hardy, 149 L. T. 165; Brune v. Stensto, 2 D. L. R. 
795, 52 B. C. R. 532 (1938) ; J&owder v. Roy, 2 D. L. R. 284, 
0. W. N. 222 (1944) ; and Swan v. Mathers, 0. W. N. 495 
(1942). Defendant's argument completely fails as to conduct 
in these jurisdictions, and as heretofore observed, certainly 
the conduct of Defendant with Plaintiff's former wife in 
New York, Nevv Jersey, Pennsylvania and any other state 
is relevant and probative as to what took place between 
them in Canada, Idaho, Utah, and other jurisdictions. 
The principal decision relied upon by Defendant, In re 
Glasser, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 723 (1950) involved a completely 
different problem from that presented on this appeal. It 
was a decision by the New York court, a jurisdiction where 
the cause of action is abolished, and related to conduct 
within the State of New York. In the present case, the 
court entering the order is not faced with a local statute 
prohibiting such actions and the conduct involved occurred 
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in many other jurisdictions, only some of which have such 
statutes. 
POINT III 
THE ORDER APPEALED FROM DOES NOT 
VIOLATE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION. 
Appellant contends, and indeed it is the only matter 
properly in issue, that the questions propounded on the 
deposition required answers that would tend to incriminate 
him. The only incrimination to v1hich Appellant refers and 
to which he could possibly be subjected is under the laws of 
jurisdictions other than the State of Utah, i. e. the states in 
which some of the conduct inquired into may have occurred 
and the Federal courts under the Mann Act. 
No showing was made before the trial court that the 
Plaintiff was in any imminent danger of prosecution by 
the authorities of these other jurisdictions or as a matter 
of fact in any danger whatsoever (R. 25-46). As heretofore 
pointed out, Defendant is now and for sometime prior to the 
commencement of this action was a citizen of the State of 
Utah. The possibility of criminal prosecution in geographi-
cally remote jurisdictions based upon the conduct involved 
it at least extremely remote. Most of the questions which 
the Defendant refused to answer did not even call for 
answers which could incriminate him under the laws of any 
jurisdiction. 
All of the cases relied upon by Defendant in his brief 
are outmoded Federal cases involving the question of whether 
the privilege applies in a Federal Court sitting within a state 
to the danger of criminal prosecution in the State courts 
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of that state. It is respectfully submitted that these cases 
are not in point on the issue here presented. The only danger 
of prosecution conceivably related to the questions pro-
pounded to the Defendant would be under the laws of other 
states or jurisdictions. 
The general rule is stated in 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, 
Sec. 51, as follows: 
"In considering a witness' claim of privilege 
against self incrimination, the court will not take 
notice of the criminal laws of another state or sov-
ereignty." 
* * * * 
"* * * As defined by the great majority of 
the courts in this country the protection afforded 
by our constitutional guarantees against compulsory 
self incrimination is confined to the giving of testi-
mony which would tend to subject witnesses to crim-
inal liability or to a penalty within the jurisdiction 
and under the sovereignty in which the privilege is 
involved * * * all of the more recent cases sup-
port the rule that the privilege against self incrim-
ination does not extend to protect a witness as to 
matters which may tend to incriminate him under 
the laws of another jurisdiction." 
70 C. J., Witnesses, Sec. 882, likewise concludes: 
"In a proceeding in the courts of a state, a wit-
ness is not privileged to refuse to answer because 
of the apprehension of criminal prosecution in an-
other state." 
Confronted with this same problem, the Supreme Court 
of Vermont in State v. Wood, 134 Atl. 697, stated the gen-
eral rule: 
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"In disposing of the question whether the re-
spondent had the right to exercise the privilege of 
silence, we do not notice the criminal laws of any 
other state nor whether they were violated by her 
while on the trip in question. The only danger to be 
considered is such as arose within this jurisdiction 
and under the state sovereignty." 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Republic of 
Greece v. J(oukouras, 162 N. E. 345 held: 
"The question is, can the privilege of silence 
be invoked by a witness when his answer will tend 
to prove that he has infringed the criminal laws of 
a foreign jurisdiction by act or conduct which does 
not violate the criminal laws of the jurisdiction 
where he is examined? We are of opinion the privi-
lege against self incrimination extends only to crimes 
which may be prosecuted within the latter jurisdic-
tion, and the rule of protection is confined to what 
may tend to subject the witness to penalties within 
this juris diction and under the state sovereignty 
* * * Neither the Fifth Amendment nor the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States is violated by holding that the privi-
lege against self incrimination does not extend to 
crimes which are not subject to prosecution in the 
jurisdiction where the privilege is asked." 
Even the more recent Federal cases decided since the 
cases on which Plaintiff relies are in accord with this view 
and have held that the privilege does not apply to the danger 
of prosecution in another jurisdiction or in state courts. 
United States v. Mu1"dock, 284 U. S. 141, 52 Sup. Ct. 63, 
76 L. Ed. 210 (1931) ; Cla.iborne v. United States, 77 F. 2d 
682 (8th Cir. 1935) ; and MilleT' v. United States, 95 F'. 2d 
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492 (9th Cir. 1938). The Murdock case was decided subse-
quent to any of the Federal cases relied upon by Plaintiff. 
In United States v. Murdock, the Supreme Court held 
that the fact that a federal immunity statute did not pro-
tect against state prosecution was not grounds for refusal 
to answer. The Court stated at 284 U. S. 149: 
"The English rule of evidence against compul-
sory self incrimination, on which historically that 
contained in the Fifth Amendment rests, does not 
protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in vio-
lation of another country. * * * This court 
has held that immunity against state prosecution is 
not essential to the validity of federal statutes de-
claring that a witness shall not be excused from 
giving evidence on the ground that it will incrim-
inate him, and also that the lack of state power to 
give witnesses protection against federal prosecu-
tion does not defeat a state immunity statute. The 
principle established is that full and complete im-
munity against prosecution by the government com-
pelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the 
protection furnished by the rule against compulsory 
self incrin1ination." 
In the case at hand, it is clear that Plaintiff is immune 
to prosecution in the State of Utah, because no inquiry was 
made during the deposition as to any acts of misconduct 
occurring in this state. 
Even the older federal cases which have announced 
the contrary result referred to by Plaintiff require that 
the danger of prosecution in the state court be a real and 
present danger and not just a remote possibility. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN AWARDING RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS' 
FEES. 
Respondent's motion to compel Defendant to answer the 
questions propounded was made pursuant to Rule 37 (a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule provides in 
part that: 
"If the motion is granted and if the court 
finds that the refusal was without substantial justi-
fication the court shall require the refusing party 
or deponent and the party or attorney advising the 
refusa~ or either of them to pay the examining party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in 
obtaining the order, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees." 
The trial court expressly made a finding in its order 
that the refusal of the Defendant to answer the questions 
was without substantial justification (R. 47-8). This finding 
was made pursuant to the discretion granted to the trial 
court after a complete hearing of the matter with ample 
opportunity on the part of the trial judge to evaluate the 
merit of Defendant's refusal (R. 25-46). 
An examination of the deposition (R. 65) and the na-
ture of the questions asked, reveals no substantial justifi-
cation for Defendant's refusal to answer. All of the ques-
tions re-lated to facts that will be in issue at the trial and 
to conduct that will, if necessary, be proved by other wit-
nesses. Defendant's refusal has only served to delay the 
ultin1ate conclusion and disposition of this action. The trial 
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court's order with respect to attorneys' fees was fully within 
the proper limits of the trial court's discretionary authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments presented and cases cited in Appellant's 
brief do not justify the refusal of Appellant to answer th~ 
I 
questions propounded in the deposition. The argument 
raised under Point I of Appellant's brief was not in issue 
before the trial court, is without merit, and raises issues' 
which may be material at the trial of the case, but which, 
are not now properly before this Court. Appellant's consti-
tutional privilege against self incrimination was not vio-
lated. The order of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DENNIS McCARTHY, 
DAVID E. SALISBURY, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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